The CRS report “Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah: Current Violence and Potential Escalation” (September 20, 2024) analyzes the escalating conflict between Israel and Hezbollah following Hezbollah’s attacks in support of Hamas during the ongoing Israel-Hamas war. Since July 2024, the violence has intensified, with Hezbollah’s extensive missile and drone arsenal threatening Israel’s strategic sites. Covert Israeli strikes have also targeted Hezbollah assets, further raising tensions.
Hezbollah’s alliance with Iran is central to the conflict, though its degree of autonomy is debated. The risk of a broader war looms, as Israel has moved military forces to the Lebanon border. Both sides must weigh their military strategies carefully, with Hezbollah aiming to maintain its influence while Israel seeks to neutralize the threat. U.S. involvement, through military aid and diplomatic efforts, is significant, but questions remain about the possibility of direct U.S. military intervention if the conflict escalates further.
The situation poses serious risks to regional stability, displacing thousands of civilians and drawing attention to the potential humanitarian consequences. The report concludes by emphasizing the challenges in finding a diplomatic solution, particularly with Hezbollah’s deep entrenchment in Lebanon and its ongoing military threat.
Hezbollah’s Rocket and Missile Arsenal
Category | Model | Range | Diameter | Warheads | Arsenal |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Short-Range Unguided Rockets | “Katyusha” | 4-40 km | 107-122 mm | 6-20 kg high explosive (HE) or submunitions | 40,000-80,000 |
Fajr-1 and Type 63 derivatives | 8-10 km | 107 mm | 8 kg HE fragmentation | ||
Burkan | 10 km | 240 mm | 100-500 kg HE | ||
Falaq-1 | 10-11 km | 240 mm | 50 kg HE | ||
Falaq-2 | 10-11 km | 333 mm | 120 kg HE | ||
Shahin-1 | 13 km | 333 mm | 190 kg HE | ||
Type 81 | 20.5 km | 122 mm | 39 submunitions | ||
Long-Range Unguided Rockets | Fajr-3 | 43 km | 240 mm | 45 kg HE | 60,000-80,000 |
Fajr-5 | 75 km | 333 mm | 90 kg HE | ||
Raad-2/Raad-3 Uragan-type | 60-70 km | 220 mm | 50 kg HE | ||
Khaibar-1 | 100 km | 302 mm | 150 kg HE | ||
Short-Range Unguided Ballistic Missiles | Zelzal-1 | 125-160 km | 610 mm | 600 kg HE | 20,000-40,000 |
Zelzal-2 | 210 km | 610 mm | 600 kg HE | ||
Fateh-110/M-600 | 250-300 km | 610 mm | 450-500 kg HE | ||
Intermediate-Range Unguided Ballistic Missiles | Scud-B/C/D | 300-500 km | 880 mm | 600-985 kg HE | 10-50 |
Short-Range Guided Ballistic Missiles | Fateh-110/M-600 | 250-300 km | 610 mm | 450-500 kg HE | 150-400 |
Total | 120,000-200,000 |
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2024
(citing various sources).
Timeline of Israel-Hezbollah Conflict
Year | Event |
---|---|
1982-1985 | Israel’s invasion of Lebanon triggers resistance, leading to the establishment of Hezbollah with help from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. |
1985 | Israel withdraws from central Lebanon but maintains control in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah becomes the main resistance force against Israel’s presence. |
1992-1994 | Hezbollah bombings of Israel’s embassy (1992) and a Jewish community center (1994) in Argentina kill 29 and 85 people, respectively. |
1996 | Hezbollah attacks Israel, triggering the 17-day Israeli “Operation Grapes of Wrath,” killing more than 200 Lebanese. |
2000 | Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah claims victory and maintains that Israel still occupies parts of Lebanese territory. |
2006 | Israel and Hezbollah engage in a 34-day war, with 160 Israelis and 1,200 Lebanese killed. UN Security Council calls for non-Lebanese forces to withdraw north of the Litani River, but Hezbollah does not comply and begins to rearm. |
2011-Present | Hezbollah assists Iran in defending the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad during the Syrian Civil War, facilitating greater arms transfers from Iran to Hezbollah. |
2023-Present | Hezbollah commences cross-border fire with Israel after the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war. As of September 2024, over 500 Lebanese and 30 Israelis have been killed. |
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