Reports that Donald Trump is prepared to tell Recep Tayyip Erdogan he will work to restore Turkey’s place in the F-35 program deserve more scrutiny than the headline suggests. The gap between a president signaling political goodwill and Turkey actually taking delivery of stealth fighters is wide, and it is worth walking through exactly where that gap sits before assuming this is a done deal.
The core obstacle has not moved since 2019. Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 air defense system triggered CAATSA sanctions and a statutory bar, passed by Congress, that prohibits F-35 sales to Turkey for as long as the S-400 remains on Turkish soil. Nothing reported so far suggests Ankara is prepared to give up that system. Without that concession, any presidential assurance to Erdogan is closer to a political gesture than a policy shift, since the underlying law was never repealed and a sitting president cannot simply waive an act of Congress by informal understanding.
That is likely why the reporting describes an exchange of letters rather than a signed agreement or a formal notification to Congress. A real arms sale of this magnitude would trigger a congressional review period during which lawmakers can move to block it outright. Given how entrenched skepticism of Turkey remains on the Hill — reinforced by years of S-400 friction, Turkish conduct in Syria, and Ankara’s posture toward NATO allies — a joint resolution of disapproval is a realistic scenario if this moves from rhetoric to formal process.
From an Israeli vantage point, the strategic math is straightforward and has already been said publicly: Netanyahu has told Trump directly that Turkey should not receive F-35s or the engines that power them, framing it as a matter of regional air superiority rather than bilateral US-Turkey relations. That framing is accurate. Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region rests substantially on being the only regional actor operating fifth-generation stealth aircraft. Turkey holding F-35s would not erase that edge, but it would meaningfully narrow it, particularly given the deterioration in Ankara-Jerusalem relations since October 2023 and Erdogan’s consistent rhetorical hostility toward Israel over Gaza.
It is also worth separating the F-35 airframe question from the jet engine sale that has already moved forward. The administration’s formal notification to Congress last month covering roughly seven hundred million dollars in engine sales to Turkey is a separate track, tied to Turkey’s existing F-16 fleet, and its progress suggests the administration is willing to expend political capital on Ankara even where friction with Israel is a known cost. That should inform how seriously the F-35 signal is taken: this is not an isolated gesture but part of a broader pattern of the administration prioritizing the US-Turkey relationship, NATO cohesion, and Erdogan’s cooperation on a range of files above Israeli objections on this specific point.
The realistic assessment is that Trump can offer Erdogan a political commitment and a diplomatic win heading into the NATO summit without that translating into aircraft on a runway anytime soon. The S-400 remains unresolved, the statutory bar remains in force, and Congress retains a genuine veto point that a letter exchange between two leaders does not remove. The signal is real and should be tracked closely, but the distance between signal and delivery is measured in years, contingent on a S-400 resolution that Ankara has shown no inclination to pursue, and subject to a congressional mood that has not shifted nearly as far toward Turkey as the executive branch appears to have.